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CHAPTER THREE 
A NATURALLY DISASTROUS WAR: 
NATURE, POLITICS, AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 
IN THUCYDIDES' HISTORY 
BERNARD J. DOBSKI 
Thucydides' History1 has long been recognized as a repository of 
political wisdom. Over the last six decades, scholars have increasingly 
drawn Thucydides' political insights into the orbit of classical philosophy, 
leading some to suggest that his History points to a life of theoretical 
contemplation, and not political action, as the genuine embodiment of 
natural right (Strauss, 1963; Bruell, 1974; Connor, 1984; Orwin, 1994). 
And yet, despite an increased scholarly emphasis on natural right within 
Thucydides' text, sustained, focused treatments of nature within the 
History ~ which would include its treatment of natural phenomena — are 
noticeably missing from the scholarly landscape (though see Proietti, 1992 
and Foster, 2009). At first glance, this absence shouldn't trouble the 
reader. After all, the History is about a surpassingly great war waged by 
the two greatest cities of ancient Greece; it is not a work of natural 
science. 
But Thucydides explicitly links natural disasters to the suffering 
endured during the war and thus to his claim for the war's surpassing 
greatness (1.23). And because the war's greatness is crucial to his choice of 
theme, his handling of those natural disasters that some of the actors in his 
work consider divine punishments should prove crucial to his theme; that 
is, to his decision to dedicate his single work to the political and military 
affairs of classical Greece. And yet, at the same time, Thucydides appears 
to distinguish his particular handling of his political subject from the 
conventions that characterize political life. Near the center of his History, 
he insists that he linked his account of the war to what would appear to be 
natural phenomena - a material order governed by the regular progression 
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of the seasons, and not by oracles and prophets or customs and conventions, 
informed his historiography (V.20, 26; II. 1). Taken together, these 
statements suggest a complex triangulation between his treatment of 
politics, nature, and historiography at work in the History. 
The present essay aims to clarify the nature of this triangulation in an 
effort to understand how a single work about a single war could reveal the 
"clear truth" (to saphes) about human affairs (1.20). That understanding 
may be stated, somewhat broadly, as follows: Thucydides' historiography 
operates mimetically because it embodies the very character of the 
political wisdom that the History seeks to cultivate in its audience. And 
that wisdom suggests, among other things, that the sharp distinction 
between a material world governed by fixed, immutable, and objectively 
knowable laws, on the one hand, and a cosmos governed by gods 
interested in upholding justice among men, on the other hand, represents a 
false dichotomy. Thucydides understands events like earthquakes, plagues, 
volcanoes, famines, and droughts to be the product neither of vengeful 
gods nor of a nature independent of human making, but of the interplay 
between what some, following Thucydides' initial characterization of the 
war as a "megiste kinesis" (1.1), have called the "forces of motion" and the 
"forces of rest" (Strauss, 1963, 159). 
Of course, such claims merely prompt one to inquire into the 
metaphysical status of such "forces." Who or what is behind them? The 
present effort cannot answer these questions, partly because they are 
beyond its reach and partly because Thucydides himself frustrates any 
effort to do so. While his work certainly prompts the reader to raise 
questions about causes or "first things," the distinctive focus of the History 
requires the reader to address those questions only on a human and 
political plane. Redirecting the metaphysical tendency of his reader back 
towards politics is part of Thucydides' instruction here. This chapter will 
therefore limit itself to charting a path of inquiry that one must undertake 
if one is to understand both the so-called "natural world" in Thucydides' 
History and its ability to illuminate, and thereby help the reader 
understand, the virtues of his presentation of Periclean Athens. 
Natural Disasters and Seasons in the History 
Thucydides' most well-known statement on natural disasters occurs in 
his re-statement on the greatness of the war he relates (1.23; cf. 1.1-2). 
According to our author, this war between the Peloponnesians and the 
Athenians was the greatest because it: 
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both lasted long and the harm it did to Greece was such as the like in the 
like space had never been seen before....And those things which 
concerning former time there went fame of, but in fact rarely confirmed, 
were now made credible: as earthquakes, general to the greatest part of the 
world and most violent withal; eclipses of the sun more often than is 
reported of any former time; great droughts in some places and thereby 
famine; and that which did none of the least hurt but destroyed also its 
part, the plague. All these evils entered together with this year... 
Thucydides' insistence here on the greatness of the war he relates stands or 
falls with the suffering inflicted and endured during it, suffering caused in 
no small part by the "evils" of the disasters that occurred. 
While it is clear how earthquakes, famine, and the plague can inflict 
great suffering, it is less clear, as one commentator observed, how eclipses 
produce any injury. Unlike the other phenomena listed, eclipses don't 
impact our physical environment in a way capable of causing us harm. Put 
differently, eclipses can only be related to human suffering if they are 
understood as portents of evils to come, only that is, if they are understood 
to be signs, manifested within natural phenomena, of gods who convey to 
those "who can see" that they intend to intervene in human affairs, to 
punish humans for injustices they have committed. The causal link 
between eclipses and human suffering thus depends upon human 
interpretation. Thucydides shows us just such a link in his treatment of 
Athens' defeat in Sicily, or what he calls the greatest action of the entire 
war (VII.87). The decision by the Athenian general Nicias to delay by 27 
days the retreat of his massive force from Sicily on account of an 
interpretation of a lunar eclipse (VII.50), allowed the Syracusans time to 
position their ships so as to blockade — an d ultimately defeat — t he 
Athenian navy. This naval defeat subsequently doomed the Athenians to a 
devastating retreat through hostile foreign territory, resulting in the 
surrender and captivity of the entire force and the deaths of almost all 
Athenians involved. 
The conclusion to which Thucydides draws us is that the Athenian 
catastrophe in Sicily was the product of Nicias' excessive piety (VII.50 
end) and not the eclipse itself. Whereas plagues and earthquakes (and the 
flooding that sometimes result, III.89) strike without warning, eclipses are 
taken by some to be themselves a warning, one of a divine wrath that has 
yet to befall us and may yet be avoided if we propitiate the gods. If 
Thucydides' work is in fact as great as our author declares, then its 
greatness must at least partly consist in its ability to reveal the enduring 
truth about the nature and origins of human suffering (1.1): Those which 
men inflict on each other and those that men understand to come from 
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nature, chance, and the divine. His treatment of these catastrophes must 
thus be of a piece with his analysis of politics and human nature. 
The impression that Thucydides understands these disasters to be 
the effect of a nature that governs us and whose movements are 
independent of the gods receives further support from his sustained and 
detailed treatment of the plague that devastated Athens. Long viewed by 
scholars as evidence of his scientific rationalism (Cochrane, 1929), 
Thucydides' presentation of a disease that claimed nearly eighty thousand 
lives (Hanson, 2005, 65-88) seems to identify principles of a material 
nature rather than divine wrath at work in the origins, symptoms, and 
suffering of the plague (11.48-51). More to the point, Thucydides' analysis 
of the plague's effects on human anatomy implies a nature whose laws and 
principles are fixed and intelligible to human reason. And in his 
concluding remarks on this episode he emphasizes, and thus distinguishes 
from his own practice, the tendency of men to resort to selective and self-
serving interpretations of prophetic verses both to explain their suffering 
and to imbue it with divine significance (11.54; cf. 1.20). Thucydides, it 
would seem, does not reinterpret (or rephrase) oracles and prophecies to 
make them fit the present circumstances and thereby validate their divine 
authority; he relies instead on his understanding of the present to judge the 
validity of ~ and thus the divine authority behind - oracles and 
prophecies. 
As such, it appears that an understanding of natural principles of 
causation informs Thucydides' decision to present the events of the war in 
chronological order by summers and winters; that is by natural, not 
political, markers. At the end of his treatment of the first ten-years of the 
war, Thucydides urges his reader to: 
consider the times themselves and not trust to the account of the names of 
such as in the several places bare chief offices or for some honor to 
themselves had their names ascribed for marks to the actions foregoing. 
For it is not exactly known who was in the beginning of his office, or who 
in the midst, or how he was, when anything fell out. But if one reckon the 
same by summers and winters, according as they are written, he shall find 
by the two half years which make the whole, that this first war was of ten 
summers and as many winters continuance (V.20). 
Six chapters later Thucydides drives this point home: 
This also hath the same Thucydides of Athens written from point to point, 
by summers and winters, as everything came to pass, until such time as the 
Lacedaemonians and their confederates had made an end of the Athenian 
dominion and had taken their long walls and Pieraeus. To which time, 
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from the beginning of the war, it is in all twenty-seven years (V.26.1; see 
also II. 1 and 11.65). 
By following what is common to all men — the unfolding of summers 
and winters — and not what pertains merely to local customs or 
circumstances, Thucydides' History appears to take its historiographical 
cues from a material nature that governs us and is in principle observable 
by all. But this view, which seems to receive so much support from 
Thucydides' handling of natural disasters, is immediately complicated by 
the following observations, observations which his comments here cause 
us to note. 
The Questionableness of Nature as a Guide 
As he draws to a close his account of the tenth year of the war, 
Thucydides stresses the superiority of natural or seasonal chronology to 
the practice of recording events according to who held high office (i.e., 
archons) or who had won high honors at the time of a particular event (i.e., 
Olympic victors). After all, people may disagree about when a particular 
term of office began or ended and the celebration of religious festivals or 
athletic contests can be altered and even suspended entirely by human 
agreement (III. 104 end; V.49-50). The change of seasons, however, occurs 
entirely independent of human agency. But Thucydides insists on his 
adherence to this practice in a passage where he marks the end of winter 
by the festival of Dionysus (V.20.1). And in his brief account of the six 
year Peace of Nicias, placed squarely between the end of the tenth year of 
the war and his restatement on his "natural" historiographical principles 
(V.26), Thucydides marks the beginning of this period by the ephorate of 
Pleistolas at Sparta and the archonship of Alcaeus at Athens (V.25). 
Though he insists in the following chapter on the unity of the 27 year war, 
his comments here point to an important difference between his handling 
of the two "10-year wars" and the six year, ten month peace that separated 
them. Thucydides seems to employ different methods for different years. 
One might begin to understand this difference by noting that Thucydides 
ends his account of all six years of the Peace (years ten through fifteen of 
the war) with the rather succinct "thus ended the nth year of the war" a 
conclusion reserved for only two other years of his account (the first, 11.47; 
and the eighth, IV. 116). All other years he concludes with "...so ended the 
nth year of this war as written by Thucydides." The twenty-first year of the 
war, the last year which Thucydides records, represents an exception to 
both practices since his account of that year offers no formal conclusion 
(whether intended or not; VIII. 109). 
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If the tenth through fifteenth years of the war reflect the ascendancy in 
Athenian politics of the man for whom that period is named as well as his 
piety (VII.50) and law-bred virtue (VII.86), then we might understand 
Thucydides' historiographical practice to convey his judgment about both 
Nicias and the traits for which he is best known. The consequence of this 
observation is to invite readers to distance Thucydides from years to which 
he does not affix his name as author, years associated with conventional 
practices of marking time (though cf. II. 1), the occasion of his own exile 
from Athens, Nician politics and virtues, and a nominal peace (years one, 
eight and ten through fifteen; the peculiar "ending" of the twenty first year 
of the war keeps this year an open-question). Subsequently, we are also 
invited to draw him closer to those years associated with seasonal 
chronology, the politics and virtues of a Periclean-Alcibidean axis, and the 
full violence of the war (years two through seven, nine, and sixteen 
through twenty). In other words, the years of the war can be divided along 
the following lines: convention, piety, moderation, and peace, on the one 
hand and nature, erotic daring, empire, war, and Thucydides on the other. 
But this sharp distinction cannot be sustained if only because 
Thucydides insists in this very same context on the unity of the war, a 
unity which would seem to apply to his work as well. All of the years of 
the war are written by Thucydides. How or in what way then might we 
begin to understand the historiographical unity of his epic? The possibility 
that he understands the natural and the divine to be consistent with each 
other may be discounted as simply too poetic. It is true that the duration of 
the 27-year war he composes was prophesied to last "thrice nine years" 
(V.26.4). And in his discussion of the sixth year of the war, Thucydides 
notes that the poet Hesiod was killed in Nemea, a fate consistent with a 
prophecy about the end his life (111.96). But Thucydides prevents his 
readers from endorsing the attractive, if misleading, parallel between this 
poet's death and the length of this war because he ends his account six 
years early. Interestingly enough, the sixth year of the war is also the only 
year of the war whose account begins and ends with the report of natural 
disasters: earthquakes and the resultant flooding (III.89) and the eruption 
of Mt. Aetna (III. 116), the "invasion" of water and fire into their opposite 
elements. The apparent synchronicity between the seasonal calendar and 
natural disasters suggested here is punctured by Thucydides' report that 
Mt. Aetna's volcano erupted in the spring of the following year (the 
seventh year of the war). Thucydides' artful insertion of the volcano here 
at the end of the sixth year violates the principles he insists upon at V.24 
and 26 (and II. 1). By muddying the "historiographical waters," as it were, 
Thucydides draws the attention of the reader to his treatment of this year.2 
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Thucydides prepares his treatment of the sixth year of the war with a 
mention of the Athenians in Sicily and their inability to attack the islands 
of Aeolus in the summer due to the shallow water around the islands, 
preventing access to them by ship; the volcanic activity on Hiera, and the 
Hiereans' religious explanation of that phenomenon (III.88, end of the 
fifth year); and the series of earthquakes at the beginning of the sixth year, 
one of which resulted in a massive wave whose flooding turned "what was 
once land" on Euboea into sea (111.89) ki lling those unable to occupy the 
higher ground in time. Thucydides closes this introduction by attributing the 
strength of "the wave" and its varied impact on the Greek islands to the 
earthquake and its epicenter: at Orobiae the tsunami flooded most of the 
town, leaving parts of it underwater; at Atalanta, the tsunami's wave carried 
away part of the Athenian fort and wrecked one of its ships; at Perapethus, 
there was no flooding, but the earthquake caused considerable damage to 
the buildings. Thucydides is clear that the earthquake was the cause of 
these effects. But he doesn't bother to say what caused the earthquake (see 
also his refusal to speak about the causes of the plague, II.48.3). 
Thucydides thus introduces his account of the sixth year of the war by 
inviting the reader to raise the question of first causes ("what caused the 
earthquake?"), only to leave that question about the material world 
unanswered. In its place, one gets an account of "the most memorable" 
(111.90; logon malista axia) aspects of Athenian activity during this year — 
and the Spartan response to that activity — an account which focuses 
largely on Demosthenes' campaigns in Aetolia. 
This "introduction" to the sixth year of the war not only leads us again 
to think about the relationship between politics and nature; it also recalls 
the opening of the History where Thucydides justifies his work's thematic 
focus on the grounds that this war was "most worthy of note" (1.1; 
axiologotaton). And Thucydides' comments about Hesiod (111.96) a nd his 
most extensive commentary on Homer (III. 104), which digress from the 
broader Aetolian-Sicilian narrative, recall his contest with the poets (1.10; 
cf. 111.96, 104), his account of his own treatment of speeches and deeds 
(1.20-22), and the oldest or first things (1.1) whose treatment was to decide 
in his favor the "war" between Thucydides and his poetic rivals. 
Thucydides' treatment of the sixth year of the war should thus prove 
indispensable for understanding the triangulation between politics, nature, 
and the historiography of his work. 
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Nature and Politics: Demosthenes in Aetolia 
In his account of the war's sixth year, Thucydides introduces his reader 
to the Athenian general Demosthenes. Of the account's 28 chapters, he 
dedicates 20 to Demosthenes' campaign in Aetolia. Demosthenes represents 
one of the most fascinating, if perhaps least studied, political actors in 
Thucydides' masterpiece. Without ascending to the heights seemingly 
reserved by Thucydides for his "Pericles" or "Brasidas," Demosthenes 
remains the figure whose career most closely bears on our author's 
preoccupation with both great suffering and noteworthy deeds. Whether it 
is the men he lost in Aetolia (111.98), the size of his slaughter of the 
Ambraciots (III. 113), the Hellenic world's surprise over the Spartan 
surrender at Pylos (which he engineered, IV.40.1), the fate he suffered in 
Sicily (VII.87.5), or even the atrocity at Mycalessus (made possible by his 
departure for Sicily, VII.29), Demosthenes is always somehow involved at 
the extremes of the war; he is on stage for many of the greatest moments 
of the greatest war, or the "greatest motion." Is it merely coincidental that 
his career should also offer a case-study in how to create and amplify 
one's power by mirroring the movements of the material world? 
Demosthenes' campaign in Aetolia begins with an ambush of 
Leucadians and the investment of their city Leucas, itself located on an 
isthmus. Demosthenes' allies here, the Acarnanians, urge the Athenian 
general to build a wall across the isthmus thereby cutting off the city from 
the continent (for the appropriateness of such Acarnanian advice, see 
11.102). At the same time, however, Demosthenes was also urged by the 
nearby Messenians to attack the inland Aetolians, which attack they 
promised would give Demosthenes a surpassingly easy conquest (111.94), 
one that Demosthenes himself hoped would add to his other "continental 
allies" and allow him to bring the war to Boeotia without additional aid 
from Athens. Demosthenes accepted the Messenians' counsel and after 
initial successes against Potidania, Krokyle and Tichium, he was urged yet 
again to push ahead with his attack (III.97). Because he now began to trust 
"in his fortune," Demosthenes did not wait for necessary Locrian 
reinforcements. This decision proved catastrophic. The result was an 
Athenian defeat at the hands of the lighter-armed barbarian forces; the 
Aetolian darters, by virtue of their superior position on higher ground, 
were able to gain the upper hand in a battle characterized by alternating 
advance and retreat (111.97). The defeat turned into a rout as many of the 
retreating Athenians, whose Messenian guide had been killed in the battle, 
got lost in a wood that the Aetolians then burned down. Of the 120 
Athenians killed here, all of whom "were in the prime of life," Thucydides 
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says what he says of no one else in the History: these men were "by far the 
best men in the city of Athens that fell during this war" (111.98). The defeat 
was of such a magnitude that Demosthenes refused to sail back to Athens 
with his forces, choosing instead to remain by himself near Naupactus 
rather than risk suffering exile - or worse - at the hands of the enraged 
Athenians. 
Despite these failures, Demosthenes did not give up. Rather, he proved 
an adept student of both his own missteps and the ability of his enemy to 
exploit them. As such, he was able to apply the lessons learned from a 
bitter defeat in his effort to save both the cities of Naupactus and Olpae 
from the Spartan-led Aetolians. Indeed, his "education" allowed him not 
only to defeat the Spartans twice, but to deliver a blow so great that 
Thucydides called it "the greatest disaster that befell any one Greek city in 
an equal number of days in this war" (III. 113). Demosthenes' ability to 
secure the higher ground surrounding Idomene, his subsequent attack on 
Ambraciots in the dark hours of early morning, and his use of Messenian 
troops speaking the Doric dialect common to their enemies, enabled him to 
inflict a defeat of such magnitude that Thucydides refused to "set down the 
number of the dead, because the amount stated seems so out of proportion 
to the size of the city as to be incredible" (III. 113; the number of 
Ambraciots killed that Thucydides makes available starts around 1,200 or 
ten times the number of men that Athens lost in Aetolia). And such 
lessons, it seems, were not parochial; what Demosthenes learned in 
Aetolia could be applied under similar conditions elsewhere. Thus as we 
learn from Thucydides' account of the Pylos affair in Book IV, 
Demosthenes, aided by another Messenian "guide" (IV.36), was able to 
use to his advantage on the island of Sphacteria (IV.30) against his fellow 
Greeks what he learned earlier from the "continental" and barbarian 
Aetolians (III.98). 
Thucydides' account of Demosthenes' failure recalls his account of 
that retreating and advancing flood which killed all those incapable of 
making it to higher ground (111.89). Demosthenes' successes at Naupactus, 
Olpae and Idomene, on the other hand, not only mirror the destructive 
power of nature, they amplify it. By framing Demosthenes' campaign in 
Aetolia in terms of natural disasters, Thucydides invites his reader to 
consider the possibility that military failure and success hinges on one's 
capacity to account for and imitate the powerful motions of nature. To be 
sure, Thucydides never suggests that Demosthenes studied earthquakes or 
tsunamis in order to devise some new tactical approach; his own painful 
military experience provided more than enough material on which he 
could reflect. But the parallel that Thucydides draws between 
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Demosthenes' defeat and success in Aetolia and earthquakes and tsunamis 
(or even volcanic activity, III.89) suggests that nature provides a useful 
guide or template for the creation and expansion of military power insofar 
as the destructive motions at work in one can also be used to great effect in 
the other. In Aetolia Demosthenes initially fails to guarantee himself 
possession of the high ground; he doesn't adjust to the "ebb and flow" of 
battle against lighter-armed adversaries; he doesn't possess direct 
knowledge of both the enemy's numerical strength and the foreign 
landscape in which he fights; he doesn't sufficiently appreciate the need 
for local allies who might offset some of the advantages enjoyed by the 
indigenous opposition; and his defeat is turned into a rout by the dangers 
of dark woods for men of the city. Demosthenes' later victories, by 
contrast, suggest his grasp of the significance of all of these elements. As 
such, Demosthenes refuses to give battle when he doesn't enjoy these 
advantages. 
One might expand on the parallel between Thucydides' handling of 
natural phenomena and Demosthenes' exploits by observing that his 
military successes were made possible by the judicious application of an 
appropriate mixture of forces related to "land" and "sea," to "Greeks" and 
"barbarians," and to "Athens" and "Sparta." That this mixture must be 
appropriate, that it is conditional and therefore must observe certain limits, 
can be gleaned from Demosthenes' success over the Eurylochus-led 
Spartans. In that engagement, Demosthenes' distinct (or unmixed), if 
outmanned, forces routed the mixed together Peloponnesian and Aetolian 
armies (the Mantineans, who kept themselves distinct, prove an exception 
to this grim fate, III. 107, 108). A complete or indiscrete mixture of the 
elements, however, is not conducive to military success as indicated by his 
military defeats (111.95, cf. 11.102; 111.98). 
But this also suggests that such a mixture, if it is to be produced, must 
be produced intentionally; it must be the product of human intelligence 
and foresight. Demosthenes' strategic defeats and triumphs in Aetolia are 
thus properly contrasted with the undirected or unguided movements of 
nature, whose earthquakes and tsunamis, for example, impact various 
locations differently, indiscriminately sparing some human beings while 
indifferently (or unintentionally) destroying others. The success or failure 
of the Athenian general depends, at least in part, on his direct knowledge 
of the enemy's strengths and the layout of their territory. His reasoned 
grasp of the principles of military success, principles that seem to be 
reflected in the "unreasoned" movements of nature, allows him to inflict 
intentionally a staggering defeat on his enemies, one that dwarfed the 
suffering produced by his men's chance retreat into the Aetolian woods. 
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Because his understanding allows him to harness and direct forces that in 
nature seem undirected, Demosthenes may appear even more destructive 
than nature, and thus more capable of inflicting human suffering, a point 
supported by Thucydides' silence about the number of victims of the 
earthquake and tsunami. 
Demosthenes' remarkable military turn-around is based on his ability 
to take account of and replicate the interplay of forces that, as Thucydides' 
artistry shows, can also be found in nature. He was able to create and 
magnify his own military power because he understood how his own 
forces were destroyed. Thus through an understanding of a particular 
manner of decay or degeneration, Demosthenes appeared to discover a 
particular form of growth or (re)generation; he discovered how he could 
generate more power for himself and for Athens. Unlike the silence about 
what caused the earthquake that produced the devastating tidal wave at the 
beginning of 426 BCE (or caused the plague), Thucydides' narrative on 
Demosthenes suggests that the source of his creative destruction can be 
found within this supremely talented human being. Might the mind and 
soul of a man like Demosthenes prove the sources or "first causes" of the 
more powerful motions in political life? 
Demosthenes' experience in Aetolia reminds one of those Athenian 
engagements in Sicily with which Thucydides opens and concludes the 
sixth year of the war (III.88 and 116; see also 99, 103, 115). And 
Thucydides' last reference to the Greeks on Sicily (III. 116), raised in the 
context of his discussion of the eruption of Mt. Aetna, points ahead to his 
"Sicilian archaeology" (VI. 2-6), an account that appears far more 
deferential to the poetic stories of the Cyclopses and Laestrigonians than 
does his first archaeology (1.1-19). Indeed, the night assault on Idomene 
(III. 112; cf. VII.43, 44), his comments about the destruction of the 
Ambraciots (III. 112 end; cf. VII.87 end), and his references to Athenian 
action in Sicily call to mind pivotal moments in the doomed Sicilian 
expedition. Thucydides thus seems to intimate by the end of Book III that 
success or failure in Sicily will depend on Athens achieving the proper 
balance of antithetical elements. That we know the Athenians failed in 
Sicily suggests that they didn't achieve this balance. Did they fail because 
they were insufficiently attentive to the true character of their physical 
environs? Or might they have been too poetic in their outlook and 
aspirations? Given what we have already learned about Demosthenes in 
Aetolia, one wonders how this could be possible. But a closer look at the 
campaign at Pylos will show how Demosthenes' approach to nature may 
itself be a form of piety. 
44 Chapter Three 
Nature and Piety: A "Nician" Demosthenes? 
Demosthenes' greatest victory was his triumph over the Spartan forces 
on the island of Sphacteria in 425 BCE. Thucydides' artfully structured 
narrative of this campaign (IV.2-40) suggests that, despite the apparent 
role played by chance in this account, the Athenian victory here was the 
product of a carefully designed plan by Demosthenes, one designed before 
he left Athens and that he set in motion before the storm "forced" the fleet 
led by him, Sophocles, and Eurymedon to land at Pylos (IV.3). A study of 
the details of this narrative suggests that Demosthenes' plan from the 
beginning was to draw the Spartans into an engagement that would tempt 
them to make the colossal strategic blunder of landing troops on the island 
of Sphacteria, a plan ultimately aimed at the capture and humiliation of the 
Spartan hoplites, and the destruction of their formidable warrior 
mystique.3 To see the kind of foresight such a plan would entail, let us 
consider some of the following examples. 
Demosthenes understood that the Spartans would not be able to take by 
land the garrison at Pylos once it was fortified (especially with their army 
in Attica and their city in the midst of a festival), that the Athenians would 
thus need to fortify their positions before the Spartan army could return 
and their city regroup, and that the Spartans would subsequently need to 
depend on their navy to remove the Athenians from occupied territory. 
Moreover, because he could count on Spartan insecurity about its navy, 
Demosthenes could reasonably predict that the Spartans would be inclined 
to rush their naval efforts to retake Pylos before the Athenian fleet, which 
left behind a "vulnerable" force under Demosthenes' command, could 
backtrack from its presumed westward voyage and relieve Sparta's siege 
(a return Demosthenes made sure the Spartans knew was imminent). And 
this meant knowing that the Spartans would use the same tactic they 
employed in the Crisaean Gulf against Phormio's numerically inferior 
navy, one which deployed hoplites on the shores to support their triremes 
(11.86.1, 87.6). Of course, all of this would have been for naught had 
Demosthenes not also known the physical character of both Pylos and 
Sphacteria, knowledge of which was crucial for his particular fortifications 
at Pylos and his detailed assault plan for Sphacteria. Demosthenes' plan, in 
both design and execution, thus presupposes a grasp of the physical nature 
of the locations involved (and the waters around them) and the political 
psychology and habits of the respective belligerents. It is no accident that 
the Athenian demagogue Kleon arrives at Pylos when he does or that he 
does so with the kinds of troops perfectly suited for fighting on the rocky 
terrain of Sphacteria (IV.28-30). 
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What the narrative, at an initial glance here, suggests is due to luck or 
the accidental motions of nature or human impulse (IV.4.1; Hornblower, 
1996, 156), Thucydides, through his own deliberately designed account, 
shows the reader to be instead the work of intelligence; what otherwise 
appears happenstance is in reality the product of human forethought 
(Connor, 1984, 110; Hornblower; 1996, 152; see also 1.138). Such artistry, 
employed in the service of this particular insight, naturally invites the 
reader to wonder if Thucydides' handling of the Pylos affair doesn't also 
serve as a metaphor for the intelligence at work in his own historiography. 
Moreover, the blow Demosthenes sought to strike to the reverence the 
Greeks reserved for the Spartans ~ showing the god-fearing and ancestral 
worshipping Spartans to be "paper tigers" — w ould surely have far-
reaching implications for the war (as it promised to, see IV. 15-22; 40.1). 
Might it not also bear on Thucydides' interest in exposing the true 
character of Sparta's piety and her famed power? 
Demosthenes' success here is not attributable to intelligence alone. Just 
before the Spartan navy attempts a difficult landing on Pylos — at the one 
place in the fortifications that Demosthenes has curiously left vulnerable ~ 
he addresses those few men chosen to defend the rocky beach (IV. 10). 
Demosthenes begins by stating that he doesn't want those who share in the 
present danger to try to show themselves wise by calculating all of the 
odds against them. He then follows this admonition by calculating the 
many reasons why the Athenians at the beach landing should be confident 
in the coming engagement. These reasons make up the rest of his brief 
speech. That Demosthenes has carefully weighed all of the "perils" should 
come as no surprise to anyone. And his soldiers should indeed take 
comfort from the detailed planning of their general. 
But given his original admonition, one can't help but wonder if 
Demosthenes isn't committing the very "sin" against which he has 
cautioned his men. Isn't he indulging the desire to display his wisdom for 
others to see? Moreover, what is it that Thucydides hopes to convey to his 
readers about Demosthenes by presenting such an obvious inconsistency 
in this speech - the only speech of Demosthenes recorded in direct 
discourse in the entire History — in the midst of a narrative that both points 
to and replicates the general's remarkable intelligence and subtlety? If this 
speech represents Demosthenes' rhetoric, then that rhetoric trains those 
capable of following it to see/or themselves both the value of calculation 
and that Demosthenes possesses that virtue in spades. We thus might 
begin to understand why the generals, sailors, and soldiers who initially 
rejected his advice to fortify Pylos, embraced this plan with such 
enthusiasm once they could see its wisdom for themselves (Haduong, 
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2006). One might even wonder if his "inconsistency" here doesn't shed 
light on the motive behind his careful orchestration of all of the forces at 
Pylos. Does Demosthenes seek to produce the kind of triumph that would 
reveal his intelligence to those carefully trained to see and appreciate it? 
If this is true, then Demosthenes' subtle revelation of his own 
brilliance should not be confused with the vulgar and selfish display of 
one's cleverness that he advises against (because it would imperil the 
Athenian cause at Pylos) and that Kleon so violently denounces as 
politically harmful (III.37). After all, Demosthenes secures for Athens a 
tremendous victory for which Kleon tries to take the credit. Nor should 
such a refined self-disclosure be confused with the gaudier "Olympic" 
aspirations of the tyrannical Cylon (1.126) or the slippery Alcibiades 
(VI. 16.2; cf. V.80). There is something more Diodotean, and thus 
Thucydidean, in Demosthenes' self-display. But Thucydides, no less 
subtly than his Demosthenes, also points to an important difference 
between himself and this general. Thucydides tells us that in his effort to 
persuade his fellow generals to fortify Pylos, Demosthenes appeals to the 
nature of the place; it was "strong by nature" (phusei karteron on, IV.3.2). 
Later, Thucydides, when speaking of the virtues of Pylos in his own voice, 
refers only to the "place itself' (tou koriou auto karteron, IV.4.2; Strauss, 
159, 1963). He refuses to attribute to nature the particular virtues that 
recommend the fortification of Pylos. 
The difference between the two men might be stated broadly, if 
imperfectly, as follows. Demosthenes can only operate militarily as he 
does if he thinks the political and material worlds operate according to 
fixed laws and principles that can be known and mastered, or at least 
predicted, by human beings. For Demosthenes, the material world is 
something that can be manipulated or "negotiated" to serve his own 
political and military goals. While this view would exclude the belief in 
divine beings who could intervene in human affairs by moving natural 
elements according to their own wishes or impulses, it nevertheless views 
the material world, as something that can be known and manipulated by 
man, as an ordered "home" that is not completely indifferent to human 
hopes and aspirations. In this respect, Demosthenes' naturalistic view of 
the world is similar to the kind of piety practiced by Nicias, who seeks to 
divine the will of the gods through a "reading" of nature's motions and to 
propitiate those gods by long-standing rituals and practices. The trust in 
"fortune" of which his defeats in Aetolia cured him appears to have been 
replaced by a trust in an ordered and intelligible nature. 
That Thucydides' criticism of Nician piety as too trusting in divination 
(VII.50.4) might also apply to Demosthenes' view of nature receives 
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additional support by the ways his text invites the reader to think of these 
two men together. Demosthenes' first failed campaign is introduced 
alongside Thucydides' reference to Nicias' ineffective Melian expedition 
(111.91). A nd that campaign began in Nemea, the precinct famous for the 
prophesied death of Hesiod (111.96), an image whose richness prompts one 
to wonder if Demosthenes' own military hopefulness originates in a form 
of poetry or prophecy. Later, in Sicily, Demosthenes twice objects 
strenuously (VII.47.3, 49.2-3) to Nicias' proposal to remain encamped 
before Syracuse only to drop his opposition on the mere suspicion 
(uponoia) that Nicias' continued resistance must be due to his greater 
knowledge (which knowledge, inexplicably, he never insists Nicias share). 
For a man who was willing to argue against the views of two generals at 
Pylos and who persisted in his designs there after initially failing to 
persuade the sailors, soldiers, and captains, this willingness to trust Nicias 
here, when so much more is at stake, is baffling. Finally, Demosthenes' 
last reported speech is said to "very nearly resemble" (paraplesia legon, 
VII.78.1) Nicias' final recorded speech (in direct discourse, VII.77). That 
brief speech, after quickly noting Nicias's own good fortune and devotion 
to the gods, grounds the confidence of the Athenians equally in the justice 
of the gods and the numbers and efficiency of their hoplites. It strains 
credulity to think Demosthenes' speech could "very nearly resemble" 
Nicias' speech if it omitted half of the original. 
Thucydides' reluctance to attribute the virtues of Pylos to nature does 
not allow us to conclude that he thinks the material world bereft of all 
order; after all, summers and winters will continue to alternate. In light of 
his handling of natural phenomena, it is perhaps more accurate to say that 
Thucydides views the material world as having what might be called 
"ways" or "manners" which can be discerned or grasped, but not fixed 
natures whose material causes can be known objectively by the human 
mind. It is perhaps for this reason that Thucydides, when referring to the 
wisdom his work makes possible, refers not to human nature but the 
"human thing" (kata ton anthropinon, 1.23.4). 
Thucydides' "Manner" and Periclean Athens 
Thucydides' criticism of Nician piety is perhaps most apparent in 
books VI and VII of the History. But the reader discovers the grounds for 
that criticism (and with it the grounds for his rejection of Demosthenes' 
view of nature) in his account of Periclean Athens. Thucydides' account of 
Pericles' career occupies the latter part of Book I and most of Book II, a 
career which is more moderate than it is aggressively imperialist. 
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Thucydides situates four crucial passages on Pericles in the context of 
failed Athenian interventions in matters of succession in Thessaly and 
Thrace: 1.) his early career (1.111); 2.) his assembly of the largest army of 
Athenians ever (11.31) and his famous Funeral Oration (11.35-46); 3.) his 
third and final speech (II.60-64); and 4.) the truth about his political 
moderation (11.102). These are in turn coupled with references to the 
motions of the material world (Egyptians turning water into land, 1.109-
110; a solar eclipse, 11.28; the plague, 11.47-54; the emergence of land 
where there was water, 11.102). These passages also "touch on" Acarnania, 
a region in Greece named after Acarnus, the son of Alcmeon (I. Ill; 11.29-
30, 33; 67-8, which deals with Amphilochus, Alcmeon's brother, and 95-
101), and almost all of them deal with the virtues of possessing cavalry of 
sufficient quality and numbers. 
Thucydides introduces Pericles with an otherwise unremarkable 
discussion of a failed Athenian engagement in Thessaly: Athens tried to 
restore Orestes to the throne of Thessaly but had been thwarted in this 
attempt by Thessalian cavalry (I.111). And in their first appearance in the 
History (1.107), the Thessalian cavalry, just moments before the massive 
and evenly matched forces of the Athenians and Spartans were about to 
do-battle, betrayed the Athenians and switched sides. This betrayal tipped 
the odds of the battle which ended up as a closely fought victory for 
Sparta. The decision by Athens not to bring sufficient cavalry against 
Thessaly thus suggests a weakness within her imperial strategy, one, as we 
will see, not born from ignorance, but from domestic objections to her 
foreign policy (see also VI.24.6). 
Given this introduction, it seems that Pericles' remarkable, if somewhat 
modest, imperial success is due in no small part to his awareness that not all 
elements of Athenian society supported the goals and costs of her 
democratic imperialism. This may explain why, when the Athenians were 
enduring the devastation wrought by both the second Spartan invasion of 
Attica and the plague, Pericles decided to send a massive force of hoplites 
(almost four thousand) with nearly 300 cavalry in specially designed naval 
transports to harass the Peloponnese (11.56). By ensuring that those 
citizens whose lands and homes were currently being ravaged were no 
longer in Athens, but in the Peloponnese venting their frustration on their 
enemies, Pericles could relieve some of the domestic pressures brought on 
by his strategic decisions without also risking his city's military strength. 
Thucydides' treatment of the plague suggests that Pericles had to tailor his 
imperial policy to account for the limitations facing him domestically (see 
also 11.65.8-9). Thucydides' final "frame" of Pericles' career - his 
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treatment of Alcmeon - is perhaps most helpful in understanding the 
genius behind Pericles' successful rule in Athens. 
After relating the failed efforts of Sitalces to fulfill an oath he had 
made with the Athenians, Thucydides recounts the story of the mythical 
Alcmeon (11.102). The reader will initially resist the temptation to link this 
Alcmeon with Pericles because he is not the one for whom Pericles' 
family line (the Alcmeonids) is named. But Thucydides might pardon any 
hermeneutic indulgence on this score on the grounds that he himself 
highlights how both this Alcmeon and Pericles "silence" women (II. 102.5; 
11.45.2). And using the mythical Alcmeon instead of one of the many 
historical AlcmeoruVA related to Pericles has the advantage of revealing 
the truth about the moderate or measured basis of Periclean power without 
allowing the reader to treat one as the cause or origin of the other. In other 
words, the metaphorical use of this myth offers one more curb to thinking 
in terms of a linear causality (and thus first causes) outside of human 
agency that can be known by reason. 
The Alcmeon of lore was a matricide compelled by Apollo to walk the 
earth until he should find a land that the sun had not touched at the time he 
killed his mother. According to Apollo's oracle, Alcmeon would have no 
release from his terrors until he found such unpolluted territory. 
Thucydides reports that Alcmeon eventually found this land at the mouth 
of the river Achelous, whose alluvial deposits continually created new 
land connecting Oenia on the continent to the nearby islands. According to 
Marcellinus in his Life of Thucydides, Thucydides points in this passage to 
the "moderation" of Alcmeon. Though Thucydides makes no mention of 
the term "moderation" here, Alcmeon may nevertheless achieve a kind of 
moderation through his release from the terror caused by a belief in 
wrathful gods, a release caused by his recognition that principles of 
causation, exclusive of gods who interfere in the affairs of men, are at 
work in the world (Burns, 2010, 10). 
If Pericles' ability to hold Athens together during the war results from 
an awareness of the limitations that constrained his imperial policy, then 
perhaps we see in Alcmeon's story the roots or ground of such an 
awareness. Alcmeon seems to learn not to impose on the world his own 
views of the gods and their roles in the affairs of men; his is an education 
in the principles of human behavior, the power of necessity, and the proper 
balancing of the principles of "land" and "sea" (and of "motion" and "rest" 
and "Greek" and "barbarian"), that proves so crucial to Demosthenes' 
military successes. And it seems the grasp of this mixture allows Pericles 
to navigate the contending forces of Athenian politics, those, like the more 
conservative oligarchs, who represent land and thus rest, and the more 
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radical, immoderate and pro-imperial democrats, who represent water and 
thus motion. 
To say that the moderate rule reflected in Pericles' careful blending of 
rival forces resembles the blending that proved so crucial to Alcmeon's 
"liberation" is not to say that his understanding is the same as that 
conveyed by the myth. After all, like Demosthenes, Pericles evinces more 
than once a desire for the kind of fixity or rest in Athenian political affairs 
(1.140.1, 143.5; 11.41.4, 42, 45.2) that is implicit in Demosthenes' view of 
an ordered and intelligible material world. Pericles may thus share the 
piety of Demosthenes from which reflection on Alcmeon's experience 
should cure one. For this reason, Thucydides can no more endorse 
Periclean moderation than he can endorse Demosthenes' view of nature. 
The virtue of the Alcmeon myth is not that his particular moderation 
informs or powers Athenian imperial policy. Its virtue consists in showing 
how a kind of psychic moderation can be caused by reflecting on the 
interplay of land and water and thus categories like "motion" and "rest," 
"human" and "divine." What the reader must wonder is whether or not 
there is an alternative to the pious religiosity of Nicias and the equally 
pious, if less religious, views of Demosthenes and Pericles. Is there an 
alternative that can lead the reader to a self-knowledge free from the pious 
hopes plaguing the work's actors? As we saw in Thucydides' treatment of 
Demosthenes, two possible sources of the most powerful motions in the 
human and political worlds were the minds and souls of certain talented 
individuals. But what kind of treatment of first causes reserves a place for 
the mind and the soul, whose desire for self-disclosure, and thus self-
understanding, seem to be the real source of motions in political life, such 
as we saw in the campaign at Pylos? 
Thucydides' work constitutes such an alternative through its very 
historiography. Thucydides' manner, that is his particular treatment of the 
war, is Periclean insofar as it reflects the statesman's ability to blend 
successfully antithetical forces at work in his community through a 
narrative that weaves together politics and nature, that counterbalances 
issues of motion and rest, and that braids stories of the Spartans and 
Athenians, and Greeks and barbarians into a unified account of Periclean 
Athens at war. But it does so without endorsing the belief in a cosmic 
order that corresponds to human hopes and desires. And because his work 
places politics at its thematic center, Thucydides' focus reinforces what he 
indicated earlier about Demosthenes' motives in Pylos: on the question of 
causes, Thucydides, instead of dilating on the metaphysical status of 
nature and the divine, substitutes the motions of the mind and the soul — 
perhaps even the motions of his own soul (see 1.1.1 and 1.1.2; Dobski, 
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2010, 131-132) - as they come to light through his particular presentation 
of Periclean Athens. 
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52 Chapter Three 
Notes 
1 T hucydides' work has no official title. I follow convention in referring to it as the 
History. All references to Thucydides' History are in standard book, chapter, and, 
where relevant, sentence, form. Translations of Thucydides' Greek are from 
Hobbes's rendering (1989). 
2 While the present essay owes a great deal to the chapter on Thucydides in The 
City and Man by Leo Strauss, my treatment of Thucydides' handling of the sixth 
year of the war is especially indebted to his comments in footnotes 10, 70, and 83. 
3 My understanding of the details surrounding the Pylos affair, especially as those 
details bear on Demosthenes' ultimate strategy in this campaign, owes a 
considerable debt both to the treatment of the secondary literature and to the 
sensitive exegesis of this narrative by Thang Teddy Haduong (2006). 
